Six-Day War: 50th Anniversary with Elliott Abrams | VIEWPOINT

Elliott: If you had said, you know, there’s gonna come a point where the Arab States are gonna be very interested in improving relations with Israel no matter what they’re doing in the West Bank. People, again, would have said, “You have no understanding of Arab politics.” But here we are. In terms of their aid levels, their political involvement, they are much more interested in good relations with Israel than good relations with the Palestinians. Danielle: Elliott Abrams, thank you so much for joining me. It’s really a pleasure to have you here. Elliott: Thank you. Danielle: I don’t need to brag about your
credentials. You’re a senior fellow at The Council on Foreign
Relations, Deputy National Security Adviser in the Bush administration handling the Middle
East, and a really long list, as long as my arm, of previous credentials. But we’re actually here to talk a little bit
about history and its impact on the present. It’s the 50th anniversary – incredibly – of the
Six-Day War coming up. Thinking back on it, to me, it seems like
it was a real turning point for the Middle East, a turning point for the State of Israel
and its relationship with the Arab world. But I’d love to hear how you see it. Elliott: Well, I think you’re right. I think it was a turning point. First of all, Israel had survived 1948 and
1956, but 1967 was different. It was a huge victory, and it must have changed
Arab attitudes. Yes, there was a ’73 war, as well, but still,
this was the one where Israel said, “Not only are we here to stay, but we’re capable of
defeating all of you and expanding.” And I think that was, itself, a turning point. And then Israel had all this territory, and
had to figure out what to do with it – territory that it didn’t get in 1948 in the West Bank
and Jerusalem, and then some Syrian territories and Egyptian territory that could be kept
or negotiated. So, I think it changed everyone’s view including
the American view. There is an illusion that we were great allies,
U.S. and Israel from 1948 on. It’s not true. The real change is ’67, where Lyndon Johnson
and others say, “Wow, this country might be useful. It could be an ally.” And this is after ’67 that we really begin
to sell and give significant amounts of armaments to Israel. Danielle: Why were we not there for the State
of Israel? Now, if you if you talk to any American politician
they’ll say, “Since the beginning, we’ve stood by doughty little Israel.” But as you say, that wasn’t the case. It really was…it was ’67 when Israel defined
itself, somehow, militarily, National Security wise, in the mind’s eye of the United States. Elliott: Yeah. I think, you know, if you go back, the State
Department, the CIA, the establishment, had really not been for the foundation of the
State of Israel in 1948. George Marshall, Secretary of State then,
had told Truman…not only had he told Truman, “Don’t do it,” he had told Truman, “If you
do it and should you run for re-election, I would not vote for you.” And it’s pretty rough stuff. So the whole foreign policy defense establishment
was against it and viewed Israel in the ’40s, in the ’50s, in the ’60s as a terrible liability. We wanted to definitely keep our distance
from them. After all in ’56, Suez campaigns when Eisenhower had forced the British, and
the French, and the Israelis to give up what they had gained. So we were just never really very close. The Israelis were getting their arms in the
’50s or early ’60s from the French more than anyone else. The notion that Israel was an asset, not a
liability, is the ’67 war, for the American Foreign Policy Establishment, or maybe I should
say, half of it because half of it probably still sees Israel as a liability. Danielle: Maybe not half. All of this evolution is something to unpack. And there’s sort of…I’ve got a dozen interesting
questions in my mind about this. Israel as an asset. Israel as a national security asset, really,
as you say. So it doesn’t begin until then, and maybe
it also evolves throughout this…after the ’73 war, after the Yom Kippur War, and throughout
the ’70s. But there’s also this Cold War backdrop to
it. Was that a big part of the change in attitudes
as well? Elliott: I think it was because we’re talking
about a period when the Russians are our concern in the Middle East, and the Russians have
a relationship with Egypt. And the Russians are really all over Egypt
until Sadat finally throws them out. So there was this fear, and this does go back,
again, to the ’40s, the closer we come to Israel, the more opening we give the Soviets
to move in. And there was probably some truth to it because
the level of enmity between all the Arab states and Israel those days was exceptional. What we’re seeing now in this decade is really
quite new. So, yeah, I would say, you’re absolutely right,
the Cold War and the fear that friendliness with Israel opens opportunities for the Soviets
is a big deal. Danielle: So let’s talk about the Palestinians
and this territory that the Israelis gained in 1967. In the
vernacular of Middle East studies, and that’s a bit of an inside joke for anybody who’s
watching. In the vernacular of
Middle East studies, Israel had a claim to legitimacy within its ’67 borders. It was created by a United Nation’s resolution. Yes, of course, there was all this conflict,
the Arabs didn’t like it, but at the end of the day, this was a country that only had
half of Jerusalem, and Arab States occupied the West Bank, Gaza, half of Jerusalem. All of a sudden here’s Israel, and basically,
as we know Israel, now, in many ways except for…well, I guess Gaza comes later. And yet, the narrative of the Palestinians
has been rewritten in many ways to begin then. But it didn’t start then, it started before
the Six-Day War. Talk a little bit about how you see the evolution
and how the Six-Day War has become this iconic event for the Palestinian… Elliott: Yeah, that’s a very interesting point. I mean the West Bank is owned, controlled
by Jordan after 1948 until the ’67 war. Okay, who in those years is saying, “Well,
what about the Palestinians? What about Palestinian freedom? What about Palestinian Statehood and Sovereignty?” No one, no one. Palestinians are talking about it a bit, but
not getting any attention on the world stage. Everybody seems to be happy with King Hussein
controlling the West Bank. The real Palestinian nationalism that we know
today starts in ’67 with, “The occupation.” And it’s sort of interesting because the term,
“Occupation” starts in ’67. The place was controlled by Jordan. How about the Jordanian occupation? Never, it’s a phrase that doesn’t exist. I haven’t Googled it, but I bet it doesn’t
even exist on Google. So what starts is, of course, the problem. The problem starts in ’67, it’s the Jews who
are now occupying the West Bank, and who are controlling the Palestinians, dominating Palestinians. This cannot be tolerated. It really starts in ’67, and you get the rise
of Arafat, of Fatah, of the PLO, not that they didn’t exist. But their rise on the world stage to becoming,
as you’ve said, a cause and a reason to delegitimize Israel, this is the June War in 1967. Danielle: The PLO is created in
the early ’60s, they get no traction. Is it… Early on, what works for the Palestinians? Is it the West Bank? Is it Jerusalem? I don’t actually know the answer to this question. Elliott: Well, from ’48 to ’67, I think it’s
fair to say, nothing really works for the Palestinians. Danielle: Right. Elliott: Starting then… you know, what’s funny
about it is, if you actually go back to then, there’s an era of good feeling for Israelis
and Palestinians. Go back to, let’s say, the fall of 1967 or
go back to 1968, there’s no border between the West Bank and Israel. Israelis go shop in the West Bank, Palestinians
who wanna go to the beach just get in their car and drive to the beach. It’s terrorism that creates the border, really. So, I think all of this is a, frankly, a sign
that the legitimacy of Israel had never been accepted. The problem was the Arab States and Palestinians
didn’t really know how to make an argument, let’s say in 1965, that the world was particularly
interested in. Now, after the ’67 war they have an argument.
They have an argument about the Golan, the Sinai, which I would say, most countries would
have said, “Well, clearly, Israel has to give them back,” and they have the argument about
the West Bank. What happens to it? Does it go back to Jordan? Does it become an independent entity? Even, surely, the Israeli domination is unsustainable. And this, at a time when it looks quite sustainable
because people are having, you know, a decent experience. There is no border. Danielle: This is very interesting actually,
because all of a sudden the Israelis have this enlarged…Israel prior to 1967 has this
Arab population, Arab-Israelis, and we think of them, you know, as Arab-Israelis. And then, all of a sudden, Israel has nominal
sovereignty over this huge additional population. First of all, we never talked then about the
demographic time bomb, which some…frankly, on both sides of the conflict like to talk
about. But, in addition, suddenly, this not very
old government has to grapple with this question. And it’s interesting because, of course, the
Labor Party, the left is in charge not too many years afterwards, and makes a lot of
decisions that have been very formative for the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. How does this happen? Elliott: Well, the left is in charge. I mean, the left takes charge of Israel in
1948 and basically keeps it for decades until Menachem Begin. So they’re in charge, at this point. I think Israelis thought, well, there aren’t
too many people on the Golan. And the Golan Heights are the place from which
the Syrian army is constantly shooting down at Israel. Okay, that’s not a demographic problem. I think most Israelis believed that, all of
the Middle East Sinai would go back to Egypt. Sinai’s bigger than Israel and… Danielle: A lot of sand. Elliott: A lot of sand, a little bit of oil. Danielle: Yes. Elliott: And they were pumping some of that
oil. Not too much population, but the notion that
Israel would keep it forever, I think, was not prominent and, partly, because it has
no famous religious sites. This is not the West
Bank from that point of view. But the West Bank and Jerusalem, now you’re
talking about significant Palestinian populations and very significant religious sites. Start
with the most significant religious site, the Western Wall of the temple, but then you’ve
got places like Hebron that are, you know, prominent in the bible. But all of a sudden, they’re under Israeli-Jewish
control. And there are lots of Israelis who, I think,
in the very beginning, think this is biblical, this is… Danielle: Let me interrupt you for a second
though. Is that right, I have to say, when I think
back on the Israel of… People talk about the post-Zionist Israel. When I think about post-independence Zionist
Israel, I don’t think of it as a heavily religious-thinking, religiously-influenced state, and,
certainly not the government, which is, you know, explicitly in many ways, antireligious. So, do you think that that’s really as formative? Elliott: Well, I do. I wanna go back to one thing you said before
because it’s worth emphasizing. Israel in 1967 is 19 years old. This is, like, the U.S. in 1808, if I’ve got
my math right. I mean, it’s really early, and they’re just
getting started. And what did they do in the early years? They fended off wars and they settled large
numbers of Jewish refugees coming from Europe and then North Africa. So, this is a young state, young government. And you’re absolutely right, Ben-Gurion, who’s
the dominant figure, Labor Party which is a dominant party, militantly secular. But when ’67 comes, and they capture Jerusalem,
I must say that the Labor Party people, all of a sudden, you know, became Orthodox Jews. But there were lots of Orthodox Jews, and
they saw this as, basically, the fulfillment of biblical prophecies. There are iconic photos. Truly it’s an overused
word, but truly iconic of, you know, 19 year-old-Israeli paratroopers staring up at the Western Wall. Danielle: I remember this. Elliott: Now, they’re not wearing religious
gear, they’re in military gear, they just captured it. But this is when a lot of religious Jews say,
“This was meant to happen. God meant this to happen, God gave us this
land and we must settle it.” So the beginning of the settlements is 1967. We now have Hebron and all these other places
that are famous in the bible. We need to be there, we need to settle them. There is a piece of this that is secular,
let’s call it, the Sharon piece. We need to settle the Heights because those
are of considerable military value, and we need to settle the places from which Jews
were driven murderously in the past. And Hebron is an example of this where there
was a famous massacre in 1929. Jews were driven out, so there are no Jews
there in 1967, that’s a reason to go back. Same thing in Jerusalem, there are areas around
Jerusalem from which Jews were driven in the ’48 war with quite significant amount of slaughter. We need to go back to those…is the kind
of Sharon message. It’s a military, security, nationalist, but
not religious message. But there is a religious side that is true,
a sense of prophecy fulfilled. Danielle: And, yet, now if we talk about this,
I would say that the two threads that you pulled on post-1967 dominate not just the
Arab world’s thinking, not just the Western world’s thinking, but a lot of Israelis’ thinking
about the territories gained after 1967: settlement, religious manifest destiny, and, of course,
the vital importance of Jerusalem, which even antireligious…even secular Israelis will
say, “Well, I mean, of course, we have to give everything back but, you know, not that.” Elliott: Yeah, yeah. Danielle: So let’s talk about, you know, we
talk about the run-up, we talk about the formative nature of the Six-Day War, and we need to
come back and talk about the war itself, as well. But understanding that neither of us are military
experts, and I’m betting you’re more of a military expert than I am. But in the decade’s since, we see the rise
of the settler movement, we see their growing importance in the Israeli body politic. And we see the changing of what are fondly
called, “Facts on The Ground,” not just places like Ma’ale Adumim, which are the suburbs
of Jerusalem, and are arguably… are… this sort of Sharon’s commanding heights
of Jerusalem, but places like Ariel, which are on the Green Line, the border between
Israel and the West Bank. What should we think about how this has impacted
the evolution of the Israeli-Palestinian issue and the conflict, and how it’s changed Israel? Elliott: Well, one of the things that has
changed Israel that…then people weren’t thinking about much in ’67 is the Orthodox
population. And that’s Jewish demography, that is to say,
secular Israelis have more children than Americans do. Let’s say, 3, whereas, we’re at about 2, 2.1,
but the Orthodox, the ultra-Orthodox have 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 children. So, if you look at the numbers now, they form
a significant block and it keeps getting bigger in the sense that the number of children,
let’s say, under the age of five in Orthodox families is quite significant. So Israel is changing that way, and that affects,
not how they view the Golan, not how they view Sinai, but, yes, how they view Jerusalem and
the West Bank. So that’s an Israeli political fact, add to
that, that you have the settlers. Again, this starts under Labor, this is not
a phenomenon of the right-wing of Begin, of Sharon. Danielle: No, in fact, it was Shimon Peres
was intimately involved in the beginning of the settlement movement as an explicit political
effort to sort of integrate and to be part of the West Bank. Elliott: In fact, if you go back to Peres and Rabin, the leaders of the Labor Party, and they’re
pro-settler, everybody’s pro-settler. Danielle: Right. Elliott: Now what’s happened is, of course,
the line just keeps rising, the number of settlers. I do think there is still, though, a separation
between the large settlements, which tend to be west of that security barrier, and the
settlements in the middle of nowhere, because at least secular Israelis, and a lot of religious
Israelis think that, you know, people who live in a settlement of 117 people in the
middle of a million Palestinians are fanatics. Whereas, the ones who live, as you said, in
Ma’ale Adumim population of 38,000, 10 minutes from Jerusalem, those are suburbanized, they’re
like you and me. So that division still exists. But this issue has become almost the only
issue. If you talk to Europeans about the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, what are we talking about? Settlements. One of the aspects of this that is really
not looked at, I think, is let’s call it the development of Palestinian political culture
after 1967, because it actually flourishes. The Jordanian hand ’48 to ’67 is very tough. King Hussein, who everybody loves now, was
a dictator. I mean, there is no democracy about this in
Jordan, he ran the place, and he ran the West Bank, and he ran it more with, let’s say,
greater oversight. So, when the Israelis take over, things open
up. How do you judge this? Take a look at NGOs,
civil society, you know, Community Associations, Bar Associations, all sort… hundreds and hundreds
get created. So, for two decades, really, there is a significant
growth in Palestinian society. They are very much affected by this partial
integration with a democracy called Israel. And they learn something for the first time,
what’s freedom of speech? What are free trade unions? What’s freedom of the press? Had none of that under Jordan. What’s the ability to go out and form a club
that has political overtones? Fine, do it. This is a Palestine that a lot of Israelis
think, can someday develop into an independent democratic state. Danielle: This is the post-’67, pre-First
Intifada. Elliott: Exactly. Danielle: So it’s basically the ’70s with a little overlap on either side. Elliott: Yup. Danielle: This is…right. And I remember this Palestine well. I worked in Jerusalem in the early 1980s,
and that’s absolutely right. Salons, you know, figures who had deep
roots, unlike the PLO, had deep roots in the West Bank and in Palestinian history who were,
you know, intellectual leaders as well as political leaders. There’s no question that this was the case. We don’t talk a lot about it, it’s interesting. Elliott: No, I mean it’s different, and then
it disappeared. Danielle: Well, is it…you know, without
getting into Oslo and exciting vast amounts of hate mail for both of us, is it the Oslo
and the legitimation of the PLO that, ultimately, brings an end to this Palestinian…I don’t
wanna call it a flourishing, because it’s unfair, but certainly this moment. Elliott: I think so. I think it’s the return of Arafat and the
acceptance on the part of the Israelis, the Europeans, the Americans that he could do
what he wants with Palestine because he’s the…he’s accepted as the legitimate charismatic,
I should say, legitimate and charismatic leader, and he just crushes all this. He brings it to an end, deliberately. The only flourishing under Arafat is his 13
security organizations that are all rivals of each other, which he does quite intelligently
and deliberately. But this kind of sidled flourishing is really
choked off. Danielle: Arafat is the quintessential Arab
leader, you know, he’s been in North Africa, he’s been in Tunisia, he’s had all of, you
know, he’s been fettered from one Arab dictator capital to another, and this is where he learns
his lessons. And, in addition, his excellent balance of
power, management of internal politics. So he brings all of this and the intolerance
that comes without…and as you say, it’s not just the Europeans, the Arabs that are
okay with this, it’s also the Israelis who are who are okay with this. It has an impact on Palestinians economically,
as well. For those of us who were old enough, we remember
that with the outflow of Palestinians that came, not just after 1948 from Israel proper,
but a lot of the outflow of Palestinians that came from the Israeli-occupied areas after
’67. These made up the management classes of the
Middle East. These were the leaders, you know, these were
the people who were in Kuwait, they ran the Gulf. Obviously, they were very prominent in Jordan,
but also in Syria, in Lebanon. And this, also, starts to end at that point. Elliott: The crowning blow is when Arafat
decides to back Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War, brilliant. Danielle: A fable Arab, right. Elliott: It really was because it turned all
of the Arab States against him. They were all on the American side, except…well,
no, I was gonna say except Syria but Hafez al-Assad was also on the American side. Danielle: Right. Elliott: So Arafat’s isolated. And the way to punish him is to send all those
people home. And it’s a gigantic disaster because they
were, as you say, prospering all over the Arab world, more or less like the Lebanese. They were viewed as really tremendously talented
people. And they sent a lot of money home, a lot of
remittances. And all that ends, and they go home, many
of them, because it’s the only place they are accepted immediately, but there’s no work. And, in fact, the West Bank economy, you know,
isn’t so terrible compared to some Arab States, I mean, Yemen or poor states, but… Danielle: That’s a low bar. Elliott: But the data is pretty poor. But you’re right about the point with respect
to Israel because, over time, they begin to see the West Bank as a security matter, almost
exclusively. Now, who’s going to keep the security for
them, who’s the agent, if you will? And the answer to that – and it’s Yitzhak Rabin’s
answer – is Arafat. And, you know, there’s the crack he made that’s
very famous about how Arafat will rule without judges and courts, and without human rights
organizations. He will keep the peace in a fairly sorted
deal with Israel. Danielle: A deeply cynical and amazingly Middle-Eastern
deal. I mean, this is another interesting
part of the conversation is, you know, now, particularly as the sort of the worm turns
once again with the rise of ISIS in the Middle East, and the end of Sunni powers become intensely
focused on the negative power of Iran. And you have this shift into blocks, you see,
suddenly, the Israelis and the Sunnis together, the Palestinians just, you know, by the wayside
for everybody, not just for the Israelis, but for almost everybody as a matter of substance. And this is the sort of…this cynical deal
in which, you know, eh, democracy, eh, the rights of the Palestinians, you know, who
cares, Arafat will take care of this. And even then, you know, Abu Mazen, Mahmoud
Abbas who is Arafat’s successor, less charismatic. Perhaps even less competent successor, is
still part of this compact for which, of course, the Palestinians pay the ultimate price. At the end of the day, Israel’s done extraordinarily
well since the ’67 war. It is the Palestinians whose fortunes have risen,
to a certain extent, but then declined. Elliott: Well, I think that’s right. I think they have suffered from terrible leadership,
and I’m struck as we look at it from today. You know, we think back to Walesa, and Havel,
and Mandela, and we see leadership matters. And they had Haj Amin al-Husseini in the ’20s
and ’30s, the Mufti… Danielle: Then Mufti of Jerusalem. Elliott: …who was pro-Hitler World War II. Danielle: A big pet of Hitler’s too. Elliott: Yeah. Then Yasser Arafat who makes Palestinians
synonymous with terrorism and crushes the, let’s call it, embryonic civil society and
democratic society they’re building. Now you have Mahmoud Abbas, and he’s not at
all a charismatic leader. And today he’s really not a very popular leader,
but he’s an increasingly tough leader because he’s unpopular, and he doesn’t wanna go anywhere. So, Palestinian society, again, has someone
who’s kind of squeezing the life out of it. I am struck that if you try to think back
into 1967, if you had said, “Well, how long do you think Israel can actually keep all
these territories?” Most people would have said, “Well, we have
to negotiate. This could be years.” If you said 50 years, people would have thought
you were simply a fanatic or a lunatic, 50 years? You know, the term unsustainable is now usually
associated with Israel’s occupation of the West Bank. Well, 50 years, it’s really quite amazing. And if you had said, you know, there’s gonna
come a point where the Arab States are gonna kind of turn away from this and be very interested
in improving relations with Israel no matter what they’re doing in the West Bank. People, again, would have said, “You have
no understanding of Arab politics.” But here we are with the Arabs of lip service,
obviously, speeches and so forth. But in terms of their aid levels, their political
involvement, they are much more interested in good relations with Israel than good relations
with the Palestinians. Danielle: So, a couple of exit questions because
we’re running out of time. I’m having too much fun, I’m afraid. The Arabs have changed. I think we’ve touched that. It’s not ’67 that changes them, it’s ’67 that
changes their appreciation of Israel’s capacity. But that’s not really the inflection point
for the Arab world. It’s much more internal and much less about
Israel, or I’m like, “Am I leading the witness?” Elliott: It’s ’67 in the sense that they begin
to think, “We have to deal with this entity, it’s not going away.” First, Egypt does, then Jordan does, formally,
so they’re at peace. Hafez al-Assad negotiates a peace deal with
Israel on off, on off, doesn’t make it in the end, but he wants to do the negotiating. And there is even some negotiating with Bashar
al-Assad when Olmert is the Prime Minister 2007, 2008. And the Gulf Arabs now come around, too. Here,
I think it’s time, Israel’s remarkable economic success, and it’s, of course, as you said
at the beginning, it’s Iran. It’s the sense of having a really dangerous
common enemy because, for all of these countries, they’ve kind of awakened to the fact, Israel’s
not your enemy. You’re an Emirati, you’re a Saudi, you’re
a Kuwaiti. The only possible effect they have on you
is that they might be good for your economy. So, at least at the upper levels, at least
at the elite in government levels, this is not an overnight change, but it is a steady
change. Danielle: So my two exit questions, I keep amending
this like “Monty Python.” But I think I have two exit questions. My one is the question of terrorism that we
didn’t touch on. We haven’t talked about Hamas at all. And Hamas is not a non-issue. You know,
as is, obviously, the Muslim Brotherhood exists, Hamas is very close to them but this
is not a thing, 50 years ago. It has become very much a thing, more reflection,
perhaps, on the transformation within the Palestinian world than about Israel. But we still do hear often the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, and particularly the battle over the West Bank and Jerusalem is the heart and the
root of modern terrorism. Elliott: Right, we do hear that. I think it’s nuts. I mean we have a phenomenon here throughout
the Islamic world, although, much more in the Arab world than elsewhere. But it does extend, I mean think of the Taliban,
think of the various groups, think of the terrorist groups in Pakistan, this is not
about Jerusalem. Bin Laden, himself, was really concerned with
who rules Riyadh, and Jeddah, and Mecca, and Medina much more than Jerusalem. Iran is much more interested in who rules Mecca
and Medina than who rules Jerusalem. So this argument is out there, but I think
it’s silly. I do think, with respect to Hamas and Palestinian
terrorism today, look, we have this phenomenon in the Islamic world. It would be very odd if you had terrorist
groups throughout the Islamic world except in one place. Only one place you didn’t find any: the
Palestinians, which means among other things that it’s gonna be difficult. The Israelis and Palestinians might be able
to work out a deal if they lived on an island. Danielle: Madagascar or maybe, wait, no that
went out… Elliott: But they live in the middle of the
Arab, Middle East, in which there’s a lot of terrorism, and a lot of ideological and
religious extremism. And that…and there is no way of them keeping
that from affecting Palestinian Arabs. So it makes solving the Hamas problem infinitely
harder. Danielle: Right. Well, the ill winds of the Middle East affect
both the Israelis and the Palestinians. Okay, it’s 50 years. Fifty years from now, let’s embarrass ourselves. Don’t worry, nobody will be watching video
in 50 years, it’ll be something much cooler. But let’s pretend that somebody’s caring. Where do we see this in our crystal ball? Elliott: Well, I think that if you could eliminate
violence in the region entirely, and create a Palestinian state in the West Bank, it would
fail. It has no port, airport, currency, central
bank, natural resources. So it seems to me that, ultimately, the West
Bank is gonna be in a form of confederation or association with somebody else, and it
isn’t gonna be Denmark, you know, it’s gonna be Israel or Jordan. And to me, the logic is Jordan because it
is a Muslim-Arab state. So, I see in, you know, 25 years, as little
as 25 years, I see a Palestinian entity that, you know, it’s kind of like Austria-Hungary,
one King, two Prime Ministers maybe, two Parliaments maybe, and I do see them living at peace. Danielle: Well, that’s an optimistic way to
end. I’m a little bit surprised, but also, delighted
to hear that. So, on that note, thank you so much for joining. This has been a really enjoyable conversation. Elliott: For me too, thank you. Danielle: Good! Cheers Thanks so much for watching this video on the Six-Day War at 50. Let us know what other topics you’d like AEI scholars to cover on Viewpoint, and be sure to check out the rest of our videos and research from AEI.

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